

Back to 'Things in Themselves'

*A phenomenological foundation for
classical realism*

A thematic study into the epistemological-metaphysical foundations of phenomenological realism, a reformulation of the method of phenomenology as noumenology, and a critique of subjectivist transcendental philosophy and phenomenology

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