

# Thinking and Deciding

**Fourth Edition**

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# Contents

<b>Preface to the fourth edition</b>	<b>xiii</b>
<b>I THINKING IN GENERAL</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1 What is thinking?</b>	<b>5</b>
Types of thinking . . . . .	6
The search-inference framework . . . . .	6
Thinking about beliefs . . . . .	12
How do search processes work? . . . . .	14
Knowledge, thinking, and understanding . . . . .	17
Naive theories . . . . .	17
Understanding . . . . .	22
Conclusion . . . . .	29
<b>2 The study of thinking</b>	<b>31</b>
Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive . . . . .	31
Methods for empirical research . . . . .	34
Observation . . . . .	34
Computer models and artificial intelligence . . . . .	46
General issues . . . . .	47
Development of normative models . . . . .	50
Descriptive models and heuristics . . . . .	53
Development of prescriptive models . . . . .	54
Classification of biases . . . . .	54
Conclusion . . . . .	58
<b>3 Rationality</b>	<b>61</b>
Good thinking and goal achievement . . . . .	61
Optimal search . . . . .	62
The meaning of rationality . . . . .	63
Rationality and luck . . . . .	64

Objections to rationality . . . . .	65
Rationality and emotion . . . . .	67
Rationality and belief . . . . .	70
Rational belief formation . . . . .	70
Self-deception . . . . .	71
Beliefs as a cause of desires . . . . .	73
Are people ever really irrational? . . . . .	74
Conclusion . . . . .	74
<b>4 Logic . . . . .</b>	<b>77</b>
What is logic? . . . . .	77
Types of logic . . . . .	80
Difficulties in logical reasoning . . . . .	82
Mental models . . . . .	84
Logical errors in hypothesis testing . . . . .	88
The four-card problem . . . . .	88
The error as poor thinking . . . . .	89
Resistance to instruction . . . . .	90
Dual processes and rationalization . . . . .	91
Content effects . . . . .	92
Extensions of logic . . . . .	93
Conclusion . . . . .	97
<b>II PROBABILITY AND BELIEF . . . . .</b>	<b>99</b>
<b>5 Normative theory of probability . . . . .</b>	<b>103</b>
What is probability? . . . . .	106
The frequency theory . . . . .	107
The logical theory . . . . .	108
The personal theory . . . . .	109
Constructing probability judgments . . . . .	112
Probability as willingness to bet . . . . .	112
Comparison with a chance setup . . . . .	113
Well-justified probability judgments . . . . .	113
Coherence rules and expected utility . . . . .	115
Evaluating probability judgments . . . . .	118
Calibration . . . . .	118
Scoring rules . . . . .	119
Bayes's theorem . . . . .	121
An example from medicine . . . . .	121
Formulas for Bayes's theorem . . . . .	123
Why frequencies matter . . . . .	126
When Bayes's theorem is useful and when it isn't . . . . .	129

Coincidences . . . . .	130
The Monty Hall problem . . . . .	131
Use of Bayes's theorem in expert systems . . . . .	132
Conclusion . . . . .	134
<b>6 Descriptive theory of probability judgment</b>	<b>137</b>
Accuracy of probability judgments . . . . .	137
Frequency judgments . . . . .	137
Calibration and inappropriate extreme confidence . . . . .	139
Improving calibration by conditional assessment . . . . .	144
Heuristics and biases in probability . . . . .	146
The representativeness heuristic . . . . .	146
The availability heuristic . . . . .	153
Subadditivity . . . . .	156
Hindsight bias . . . . .	157
Averaging . . . . .	158
Conclusion . . . . .	159
<b>7 Hypothesis testing</b>	<b>161</b>
Hypotheses in science . . . . .	162
An example from medicine . . . . .	162
Testing scientific hypotheses . . . . .	165
The psychology of hypothesis testing . . . . .	168
Concept formation . . . . .	169
Congruence bias . . . . .	171
Information bias and the value of information . . . . .	177
Utility and alternative hypotheses . . . . .	181
Conclusion . . . . .	182
<b>8 Judgment of correlation and contingency</b>	<b>183</b>
Correlation, cause, and contingency . . . . .	183
Accuracy of judgment . . . . .	186
Attentional bias . . . . .	186
Attentional bias in judging correlation . . . . .	186
Attentional bias in judging contingency . . . . .	189
Effect of goals on illusion of control . . . . .	191
Effects of prior belief . . . . .	192
Illusory correlation . . . . .	193
Personality traits . . . . .	193
Prior belief and attentional bias . . . . .	195
Understanding theory and evidence . . . . .	196
Conclusion . . . . .	198

<b>9</b>	<b>Actively open-minded thinking</b>	<b>199</b>
	Examples of actively open-minded thinking . . . . .	200
	Myside bias and irrational belief persistence . . . . .	203
	The order principle, the primacy effect, and total discrediting . . . .	205
	The neutral-evidence principle . . . . .	208
	Effect of active open-mindedness on outcomes . . . . .	211
	Determinants and related phenomena . . . . .	213
	Beliefs about thinking . . . . .	213
	Distortion of beliefs by desires . . . . .	215
	Related results . . . . .	219
	Factors that moderate belief persistence . . . . .	221
	Elastic justification . . . . .	221
	Value conflict . . . . .	222
	Accountability . . . . .	222
	Stress . . . . .	223
	Groupthink . . . . .	224
	Conclusion . . . . .	226
<b>III</b>	<b>DECISIONS AND PLANS</b>	<b>229</b>
<b>10</b>	<b>Normative theory of choice under uncertainty</b>	<b>233</b>
	Expected-utility theory . . . . .	237
	Expected value . . . . .	238
	Expected utility . . . . .	238
	Other examples of comparison of errors . . . . .	242
	Why expected-utility theory is normative . . . . .	243
	The long-run argument . . . . .	243
	The argument from principles . . . . .	245
	An alternative principle: Tradeoff consistency . . . . .	249
	The utility of money . . . . .	250
	Conclusion . . . . .	255
<b>11</b>	<b>Descriptive theory of choice under uncertainty</b>	<b>257</b>
	Experienced, predicted, and decision utility . . . . .	258
	Bias in decisions under uncertainty . . . . .	259
	The Allais paradox . . . . .	260
	Prospect theory . . . . .	262
	Probability: The pi function . . . . .	263
	Utility: The Value function and framing effects . . . . .	267
	Extending prospect theory to events without stated probabilities . .	271
	Rank-dependent utility theories . . . . .	272
	Emotional effects of outcomes . . . . .	275
	Regret and rejoicing . . . . .	275

Disappointment and elation . . . . .	277
The role of regret in decisions . . . . .	278
Rationality of regret and disappointment in decision making . . . . .	280
The ambiguity effect . . . . .	281
Ambiguity and “unknown probability” . . . . .	281
Rationality of the ambiguity effect . . . . .	282
Aversion to missing information . . . . .	284
Ambiguity and adjustment of probability . . . . .	285
Uncertainty and reasons for choice . . . . .	285
Conclusion . . . . .	286
<b>12 Choice under certainty</b>	<b>289</b>
Prominence and noncompensatory strategies . . . . .	289
Other reversals: Compatibility and evaluability . . . . .	292
Response mode compatibility . . . . .	292
Evaluability and joint versus separate evaluation . . . . .	294
Effects of the options available on choice . . . . .	295
Asymmetric dominance . . . . .	295
Compromise . . . . .	296
Mental accounting . . . . .	296
The status quo (endowment) effect . . . . .	297
Omission bias and default bias . . . . .	299
Emotional effects of the reference point . . . . .	300
Opportunity costs . . . . .	301
Positive and negative attributes . . . . .	301
Integration and segregation . . . . .	303
The extra-cost effect . . . . .	305
The sunk-cost effect . . . . .	305
The reference price . . . . .	307
Conclusion . . . . .	308
<b>13 Utility measurement</b>	<b>311</b>
Decision analysis and related methods . . . . .	311
The Oregon Health Plan . . . . .	312
Decision analysis versus cost-benefit analysis . . . . .	314
The measurement of utility . . . . .	317
Utility measurement as prediction . . . . .	317
Direct versus indirect judgments . . . . .	318
Simple direct judgment and the analog scale . . . . .	320
Difference measurement . . . . .	321
Standard gambles . . . . .	323
Time tradeoff and person tradeoff . . . . .	327
What counts in health utility? . . . . .	329
Adaptation and point of view . . . . .	329

Other methods involving matching and comparison . . . . .	331
Contingent valuation (CV) . . . . .	334
Disagreement among measures . . . . .	337
Conclusion . . . . .	339
<b>14 Decision analysis and values</b>	<b>341</b>
Fundamental versus means values . . . . .	342
Discovering values . . . . .	343
Objectives of hiring a new faculty member in psychology . . . . .	344
Conjoint measurement . . . . .	346
MAUT as a type of decision analysis . . . . .	349
Rules and tradeoffs . . . . .	356
The value of human life . . . . .	358
Teaching decision analysis . . . . .	360
Conclusion . . . . .	361
<b>15 Quantitative judgment</b>	<b>363</b>
Multiple linear regression . . . . .	364
The lens model . . . . .	365
The mechanism of judgment . . . . .	372
Do people really follow linear models? . . . . .	372
Impression formation . . . . .	374
Averaging, adding, and number of cues . . . . .	375
Representativeness in numerical prediction . . . . .	377
Anchoring and underadjustment . . . . .	380
Simple heuristics for judgment . . . . .	380
Classification . . . . .	383
Functional measurement and conjoint analysis . . . . .	385
Conclusion . . . . .	387
<b>16 Moral judgment and choice</b>	<b>389</b>
What are moral judgments? . . . . .	390
Imperatives and the naturalistic fallacy . . . . .	391
Relativism . . . . .	392
Types of judgment . . . . .	393
Morality versus convention . . . . .	393
Social norms . . . . .	395
Moral realism . . . . .	396
Utilitarianism as a normative model . . . . .	396
Moralistic goals . . . . .	396
Frequently asked questions about utilitarianism . . . . .	397
Interpersonal comparison . . . . .	399
Utilitarianism and expected utility . . . . .	401
Deontological rules . . . . .	402

Rule utilitarianism . . . . .	404
Biases in moral judgment? . . . . .	406
Acts and omissions . . . . .	407
Other possible biases . . . . .	409
Can intuitions be values? . . . . .	413
Conclusion . . . . .	415
<b>17 Fairness and justice</b> . . . . .	<b>417</b>
The study of fairness and justice . . . . .	418
Equity theory: The desire for justice . . . . .	419
Utilitarianism and fairness . . . . .	421
Intuitions . . . . .	425
Heuristics and self-interest . . . . .	434
Negotiation . . . . .	435
Conclusion . . . . .	440
<b>18 Social dilemmas: Cooperation versus defection</b> . . . . .	<b>441</b>
Laboratory versions . . . . .	442
Prisoner's dilemma . . . . .	443
Effects of repetition . . . . .	444
N-person prisoner's dilemma . . . . .	444
Normative and prescriptive theory of social dilemmas . . . . .	446
Motives in social dilemmas . . . . .	449
Altruism . . . . .	450
Competition . . . . .	452
Fairness, equality, and envy . . . . .	452
Fear and greed . . . . .	453
Trust . . . . .	457
Voters' illusions . . . . .	458
Solutions to social dilemmas . . . . .	462
Experimental approaches . . . . .	462
Social reform . . . . .	467
Conclusion . . . . .	468
<b>19 Decisions about the future</b> . . . . .	<b>471</b>
The choice of personal goals . . . . .	473
Good reasons for sticking to plans . . . . .	475
Bad reasons for sticking to plans: Biases . . . . .	476
Discounting . . . . .	478
Economic theory of discounting . . . . .	478
Normative theory of discounting . . . . .	480
Descriptive data on discounting . . . . .	482
The rationality of personal discounting . . . . .	487
Self-control . . . . .	488



Why we need self-control . . . . .	489
Methods of self-control . . . . .	489
Emotions and time . . . . .	492
Adaptation, contrast, and heuristics . . . . .	493
Morality and prudence . . . . .	495
Conclusion . . . . .	496
<b>20 Risk</b>	<b>497</b>
Normative theory . . . . .	498
Public control of risk . . . . .	499
Private insurance . . . . .	501
Investment and entrepreneurs . . . . .	501
Risk regulation and the intuitions that support it . . . . .	502
The psychometric approach . . . . .	503
Voluntary versus involuntary . . . . .	504
Known versus unknown . . . . .	505
Catastrophic versus individual . . . . .	506
Benefit . . . . .	507
Other biases in risk judgments . . . . .	507
Neglect of probability . . . . .	507
Proportions versus differences . . . . .	509
Zero risk . . . . .	511
Individual versus statistical . . . . .	512
Natural versus artificial . . . . .	512
Omission versus commission . . . . .	514
Intuitive toxicology and naive theories . . . . .	515
Intuitions about tort law . . . . .	516
Insurance and protective behavior . . . . .	516
Investors and entrepreneurs . . . . .	519
Individual and sex differences . . . . .	523
Conclusion . . . . .	524
<b>References</b>	<b>527</b>
<b>Author Index</b>	<b>567</b>
<b>Subject Index</b>	<b>577</b>